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STATEMENT OF FACTS
As a part of Dr. Hultgren's Statement of Facts,
found in paragraphs 5 and 6 on page 6 of his brief, counsel
gives the date the Notice of Intent to Commence Action was
served by Andreini and the date the Request for Prelitigation
Review was served.

The following facts should be added so

this Court can properly review the issues.
1.

The Notice of Intent to Commence Action and

Claim was filed with the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing by mail on July 11, 1989, within 8
days prior to service upon Dr. Hultgren of the Request for
Prelitigation Review.

(see Tab # 1 for copy of letter)

Also, on page 4 of Dr. Hultgren1s brief he refers
to pp. 37-45 of Andreini's deposition which contains an
amendment on p. 4 4 not shown on his copy.
2.

In response to the following question on p. 44

line 10 of Andreini's deposition. (Tab # 2 attached)
Question;

Did you ever tell him what you thought

the problem was or what caused the problem?
Answer:

I didn't, no.

This answer was corrected to read:
Answer:

I didn't know.

1

ARGUMENT
POINT I. APPELLANT'S CASE IS
FACTUALLY DISTINGUISHABLE FROM
THE AUTHORITIES CITED BY APPELLEES

Appellee Beck and Holy Cross Hospital cite the
cases of Ulibarri v. Christensen, 275 P.2d 170 (Utah
1954) and Horgan v. Industrial Design Corporation, 657 P.2d
751 (Utah 1982) which hold that emotional distress is
insufficient to establish duress to support their argument
that Appellant has not shown he was forced to act against
his will in signing the release or that Appellant had no
other viable alternative available to him.

Appellees rely

on the fact the Appellant read the release before executing
it and had the option of no surgery.
Appellant's case can easily be distinguished from
the Ulibarri and Horgan cases.

First, neither case involved

the doctor/patient relationship.

Second, neither case

involved a situation where a doctor, either intentionally or
negligently, misled his patient as to the cause of his
injury.

Third, neither case involved a doctor inducing his

patient to execute a release by telling him that the
"corrective surgery" the patient was to receive in
consideration for the release would have a 100% chance of

2

success.

And fourth, neither case involved a situation in

which the consideration given in exchange for the release
failed.
Appellee Beck further argues that the bargained
for exchange in consideration for the release was that the
Appellant would simply "receive surgery."

Appellee Beck

argues that the language contained in the release "to
correct ulnar nerve palsy" should be interpreted as "merely
a description of the purpose for the surgery."

Appellees

drafted the release and any ambiguity as to the meaning of
the language contained in the release should be interpreted
in the light most favorable to the Appellant.

Appellee's

argument is a poor attempt to get around the fact that the
so called "corrective surgery" did not correct the injury
Appellant received to his elbows during the knee operation
by the Appellees.
Finally, the release of a claim for personal
injuries may be avoided if it is executed in reliance on
misrepresentations as to the nature or extent of the
injuries, amounting to fraud on the part of the releasee's
physician.

Haigh v. White Way Laundry Co. 164 Iowa 143, 145

NH 473; Mclsaac v. McMurray, 77 NH 466, 93 A 115; Bjorklund
v. Seattle Electric Co. 35 Wash 439, 77 P 727.

3

POINT II. THE ELEMENT OF "BAD FAITH"
DISTINGUISHES APPELLANT'S CASE FROM
THE AUTHORITIES CITED BY APPELLEES

Appellee Holy Cross Hospital relies on Fox v.
Piercey, 227 P.2d 763 (Utah 1951), and other cases to
support its argument that Appellant has not shown that he
was compelled to act against his will in signing the release
by a wrongful act of the Appellees or that he had no other
viable alternative available to him.

Again, Appellant's

case can easily be distinguished from the Fox decision in
that Fox (or for that matter Ulibarri and Horgan) lacked the
element of bad faith.
Appellee Holy Cross Hospital argues that even if
there were a wrongful act by Appellee, which put Appellant
in fear, Appellant executed the release after having read it
knowing that he could have left the hospital rather than
have the surgery.

Perhaps Appellees' argument would have

merit if the Appellees had discussed the release at the time
the "corrective surgery" was agreed to prior to admission.
But, in the context of Appellant's case the argument has no
merit.
Appellant was in a state of crisis with his hands

4

deteriorating daily as a result of the knee surgery by
Appellant.

Appellee Beck had misled Appellant as to the

cause of the injury, and as to the anticipated success of
the "corrective surgery" stating that Appellant's hands
would be 50% corrected within two weeks of the operation and
100% within a month.

Appellee Holy Cross Hospital kept

silent as to the injury.

The release was not mentioned by

any of the Appellees until after the Appellant had been
admitted for the "corrective surgery."

The elements of bad

faith and critical timing are absent from the cases cited by
Appellants and distinguish Appellant's case from them.
Appellee Holy Cross Hospital further argues that
there is a "strong sentiment for enforcing contracts such as
the Release."

There is an equally strong sentiment for

health care providers to act honestly and in good faith with
their patients.

POINT III. APPELLEE HULTGREN'S ARGUMENT THAT
APPELLANT KNEW OF HIS LEGAL INJURY BY MAY 11,
19 87, OVERLOOKS THE FACT THAT APPELLEE BECK
MISLED APPELLANT, AS DID DR. HULTGREN BY HIS
SILENCE, AS TO THE CAUSE OF THE TINGLING
SENSATION IN HIS HANDS

Appellee Hultgren argues that Appellant's legal
injury occurred on May 11, 1987, relying on a statement from

5

Appellant's deposition.

Appellant's case differs from

Brower v. Brown, 744 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1987) and Floyd v.
Western Surgical Associates, 773 P.2d 401 (Utah App. 1989)
cited by Appellee in that Appellant's injury to his hands
was not readily apparent and in that he was misled by
Appellee Beck to believe that the tingling sensation
Appellant was experiencing in his hands was unrelated to his
knee surgery.

Appellant had no way of knowing he had

suffered damages to the ulnar nerve at both elbows.
Appellant could not reasonably have concluded that he had a
cause of action against Appellees for an injury to his hands
when the operation involved knee surgery based on a tingling
sensation in his fingers which was first noticed on May 11,
1987.

Even the muscle atrophy noticed by Appellant after

May 19, 1987, would not have signaled a specific injury, its
cause, and the possibility of negligence, especially in
light of the explanation of Appellee Beck and the silence of
Appellee Holy Cross Hospital and Dr. Hultgren.
Dr. Hultgren first argues that Andreini's claim is
barred by the two year statute of limitations based upon the
Foil v. Ballinger, decision, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979).

On

page 9 of his brief, he contends that Andreini knew on May
11, 1987, that he sustained an injury and that the injury

6

was caused by negligent action.

It is the Appellant's

contention that there are no facts in the records of this
case to support Hultgren's claim Andreini knew the cause of
his injury May 11, 1987.
In Dr. Beck's Answer to Plaintiff's interrogatory
# 2 8 (copy attached as Tab #3) he stated that a diagnosis of
ulnar nerve irritation (my emphasis) was made on May 11,
1987 and by May 13th it was "becoming apparent that it may
well be an ulnar neuropathy", (my emphasis added)

How can

Andreini be assessed with legal knowledge of his injury when
his own doctor, Dr. Beck, did not make his diagnosis until
May 18th?

In that same interrogatory this was acknowledged

by Dr. Beck's answer "and by May 18 the diagnosis was clear
of ulnar neuropathy".

(my emphasis again added).

It is significant to point out that Hultgren as
the anesthesiologist, like Dr. Beck, at no time disclosed to
Andreini that he may have suffered the compression injury
during surgery.

During the entire period of Andreini's stay

in the hospital, May 5th through May 18th, 1987, not one of
the defendants disclosed to him the nature of his injury or
the cause.

Andreini's case is clearly distinguishable from

the cases cited in Dr. Hultgren's brief in at least two
important areas.
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First, in Andreini1s case, Dr. Hultgren, Dr. Beck
and the hospital through its employees, either negligently
or intentionally failed to disclose to Andreini the nature
of the cause of his injury.

Dr. Hultgren asks this Court to

imply constructive knowledge of the legal injury to Andreini
as of May 11, 1987, and yet at no time did Dr. Hultgren
advise him of either the injury or the cause of the injury.
Dr. Hultgren asks that this be done in spite of Dr. Beck's
advising Andreini that his injury was likely caused by
arthritis "or from laying in bed" (see Andreini deposition
p. 4 3 and 44 Tab #2).

Dr. Beck continues to deny knowing

when the injury took place as evidenced by his Answer to
Plaintiff's interrogatory #30,

"There is no way of knowing

exactly when the injury took place".

(see Addendum Tab #3)

Secondly, there was no apparent connection between
the surgery and the injuries sustained by Andreini.
Consequently, there was no factual basis upon which Andreini
could have made the judgment that he suffered a legal
injury, especially since he was under general anesthesia for
the entire 5£ hours of surgery.

A court should not assume

as a matter of law that Andreini, because he felt tingling
sensations and atrophy in his fingers, knew of the legal
cause of his elbow nerve injuries to both arms May 11, 1987.
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There was no reason for Andreini not to believe that his
dysfunction with his hands was an unavoidable side effect of
surgery and temporary in nature, especially based upon
non-disclosure by defendants and their inaction.

He had no

reason to believe that immediate surgical intervention was
necessary to avoid permanent disability.
Finally, as to Dr. Hultgren, since Andreini was in
continued treatment for his injuries until May 19, 1987,
should not the statute of limitations begin on May 20th?
The holding in Peteler v. Robinson, 17 P.2d 244, 248 and
Massey v. Litton, 669 P.2d 248 (Nev. 1983) would certainly
support this proposition.

In Massey v. Litton p. 252, the

Court noted that the degree of diligence required by a
patient in learning of the negligent causes of his or her
condition is diminished while the patient is still under his
physician's care.

Until Andreini's post operative problems

were resolved Dr. Hultgren had an ongoing duty to disclose
the nature and cause of his injuries and to monitor
and evaluate his condition.

The jury could find that his

failure to do so constituted continuing negligence until the
date of his discharge May 19, 1987.
The patient's awareness of negligence in
malpractice cases is a factual determination.

9

Recent cases

interpreting the Foil decision cite the following factors
in making that determination:

III

the obviousness of the

connection between the treatment and the injury; (2)

the

possibility that the injury might be mistaken as an
unavoidable consequence of the medical treatment; (3) the
existence of a medical diagnosis suggesting that the injury
was caused by negligence; ( 1) the patient's subjective
understanding of the field of medicine; (5) the catastrophic
nature of the injury; and (6) the duration of the
physicianfs direct supervision over the patient.
In this case, as to item (]) above, there was no
obvious connection between the "knee surgery" and damaged
nerves in the elbows of both arms.

As to Item #2, Andreini

was led to believe the problem was either genetic-arthritic
or caused from laying in bed for a prolonged period of time.
Consequently, until he was advised by the nurse July 2, 1987
about "strapping" being the cause he had every reason to
believe his problems were an unavoidable consequence of
surgery.

As to item (3), the first diagnosis of Andreini's

injury was that which was reflected on Dr. Beck's discharge
summary of May 19, 1987.

This logically should be the

starting point for the two year statute of limitations not
May 11, 1987. Also, as to item (4) Andreini had no
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subjective understanding of medicine, such as that of the
nurse in Hove v. McMaster, 621 P. Jd *.'»4 (Ut.ih 14H0),
consequently, his actions have to be viewed from a
layperson1s standard.
As to item (5), Andreini did not suffer known
catastrophic injuries until May 19, 1987, when his fingers
became severely atrophied and claw-like and the diagnosis of
bilateral ulnar neuropathy was first made and written in his
discharge summary.

Prior to that time he was simply aware

of symptoms of something being wrong.
Finally, as to item (6) Andreini was under the
direct care and control of Dr. Beck until May 19, 198 7, when
he was discharged from the hospital.

Can it be said in

fairness that Andreini prior to May 19, 1987, had a fair
opportunity to investigate available t

<i • •

relevant

information to decide whether he had a cause of action
against Dr. Hultgren, or Dr. Beck, or the hospital?
Especially in light of the fact D:i

Be< :k, Dr. Hultgren and

the hospital deny any wrongdoing even as this appeal is
taken.
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POINT IV. APPELLEES1 ARGUMENT THAT THE
TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT
ARE PREMISED ON THE FACT APPELLANT EXECUTED
THE RELEASE AND OVERLOOKS THE FACT THAT
APPELLANT WAS FRAUDULENTLY INDUCED INTO
EXECUTING THE RELEASE

Appellant concurs with the language cited by
Appellees from Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983),
that leave to amend is discretional with the trial court
unless it can be shown that there was an abuse of discretion
which prejudiced the Appellant.

The Appellant has made

reference in his brief and in this Reply Brief to the
conduct of Appellee Beck and the conspiracy of silence
involving Appellee Holy Cross Hospital and Dr, Hultgren.
Appellant was crippled in both hands as a result
of an injury to the ulnar nerve in both elbows caused during
a surgical procedure on Appellant's right knee.

None of the

Appellees informed Appellant that he had sustained nerve
injuries to his elbows during the knee surgery.

There is

evidence in the record to show that Appellee Beck
misinformed Appellant as to the cause of the injury.

There

is evidence in the record to show I hat Appellee Holy Cross
Hospital failed to explain to Appellant that his elbows had
been injured as a result of "strapping" caused during the
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knee surgery.

There is evidence that Appellee Beck mis-

represented

Appellant that the "corrective surgery" would

correct the injury to his elbows.

There is uncontradicted

evidence that the "corrective surgery11 did not work.

All of

the foregoing substantiates Appellant's argument that he was
fraudulently induced into believing that the "corrective
surgery" would correct the injury to his elbows and that the
trial court abused its discretion when it denied Appellant's
motion to amend his complaint.
POINT V. ANDREINI'S REQUEST FOR
PRE-LITIGATION REVIEW IS NOT
PROCEDURALLY DEFICIENT

Dr. Hultgren's Statement of Facts paragraph 6 page
6 states that on July 19, 1989, Andreini filed with the
Department of Commerce and served on Dr. Hultgren a Request
>

for Prelitigation Review

Andreini mailed

the Notice of Intent to Commence Action to the Department of
Commerce.

(see Tab # 1 )

Dr. Hultgren admits this filing on

the second to the last line of his brief at page 14 and puts
the filing date as July 19, 1987.
Since Andreini filed the Request for Pre]iligation
Review within 8 days of filing his Notice of Intent to
Commence Action, how can it be argued that it was not filed
within 6 0 days as sot forth in the statute.
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If the Court

interpreted 78-14-12(2) of the Utah Code Ann. to mean "60
days after the service of the statutory Notice of Intent to
Commence Action" under Section 78-14-8, it was incorrect in
having done so.

The statute must be read literally as per

its specific terms.

If that is what the legislature

intended then the statute should be amended accordingly.
This Court should not hold that Andreini failed to comply
with 78-14-12(2) by filing the Request for Review more than
6 0 days after the Notice to Commence Action was served on
Dr. Hultgren because the statute reads "within 6 0 days after
the filing of a statutory Notice of Intent to Commence
Action under Section 78-14-8", not after the service of the
notice.
CONCLUSION
The district c<::»i u : t improper] y conc 1 uded that
appellant, on May 11, 1987, discovered or through the
exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered that
he Iiad sustained an injury and that the injury was caused by
the negligence of Defendants.

This Court should make a

specific finding that the Statute of Limitations should
begin to run May 19, 1987.
Further, the district court's ruling that
appellant's Request for Prelitigation Review was
procedurally deficient since it was not filed within 60 days
after the Notice of Intent to Commence an Action was served
14

upon Dr. Hultgren was erroneous.

The statute in question

requires that the Request for Prelitigation Review be filed
within 6 0 days after the Notice of Intent to Commence an
Action is "filed" with the Department of Commerce, not
served.
As to the "release" this Court should hold that it
was executed under duress and thus void,

For pub] ic policy

reasons the release should also be held void because of the
circumstances under which it was executed.

There should be

a complete ban on the execution of releases by patients when
hospitalized unless it can be shown that the terms were
negotiated some time prior to admission when the parties
were on more equal terms.
For these reasons, the Appellant respectfully
urges this Court to reverse the decision of the District
Court and remand the matter for trial of all issues
presented by the Amended Complaint.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

^strtz^Js*

$'

day of

1991.

Mi^T BILJAffi(S~
^
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
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J u l y 1 1 , 1989

Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing
Ileber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Re:

Eugene R. Andreini

Attention:

Loretta

Dear Loretta:
Please find enclosed a copy of the Notice of Intent to
Commence Action and Claim that was served by Certified Mail
upon Bruce Ilultgren M.D. on the 12th day of May, 1989. A
copy of the receipt is attached hereto.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,

Matt Biljanic
MB/sn
Enclosures

Tab 2

Tab 3

from laying in bed.
Q.

Did he ever venture any other opinion as to what

the cause of this tingling was?
A.

Well, yeah.

himself to anything.

He didn't want to like incriminate
It's like it could be hereditary,

it could have been going to happen anyway, it could have
been my body structure, it could have been —

I mean, he

come up with a lot of things that it could be —

be

anything and everything except maybe somebody's fault.
Q.

Did you ever tell him what you thought the

problem was or what caused the problem?

A.

I didn't, p#Kn0

Q.

Did you ever indicate to him that you thought it

might be as a result of the surgery?
A.

Oh, he knew that that was how I felt.

I mean, I

went in and everything was okay and my hands worked, and
I come out and they were bad.

So, I mean, it was — I

don't know what it was, but obviously something went
wrong.

We even discussed the fact that it was

probably —

that it was so coincidental that both arms at

the same time.
Q.

Are the symptoms in both arms the same?

A.

Yup.

Q.

Do you notice the symptoms in both arms at the

same time?
44
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have read the foregoing
testimony consisting of pages 3 through 95, inclusive,
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and initials by said corrections having been affixed
thereto.
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the text).
A.
clinical

No such definition exists.

syndrome

consisting

of

distribution of the ulnar nerve.
27.

Q.

Please

state

Ulnar nerve palsy is a

numbness

and

weakness

in

the

No text cited.

what

is

ordinarily

the

cause

of

compression

is

caused

by

"bilateral ulnar nerve compression".
A.

Bilateral

ulnar

nerve

anything pushing on both ulnar nerves.
28.

Q.

Did you make a diagnosis of plaintiff's condition

regarding his hands?

If so, when did you make it and what was your

diagnosis?
A.

The diagnosis of ulnar nerve irritation was made on

5/11/87, at which point elbow pads were initiated.

By 5/13 it was

becoming apparent that it may well be an ulnar nerve neuropathy and
by 5/18 the diagnosis was clear of ulnar neuropathy.
29.

Q.

Did you know about plaintiff's condition to his

hands prior to May 12, 198 7?

30.

If so, when.

A.

No.

Q.

Do you have an opinion as to the cause of plain-

tiff's bilateral ulnar neuropathy?
A.

See answers to interrogatories 7, 8 and 9.

is no way of knowing exactly when the injury took place.

There

It could

have occurred over a lengthy period of time.
31.

Q.

Do you agree with Dr. Nord's evaluation of plain-

tiff's condition as stated in his letter dated August 27, 1987?
If not please state the parts you disagree with.
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